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NOTES
In Cloud v. Cloud,"9 the court set forth these policy considera-
tions:
"The homestead exemption is a law of public policy of this
state, the object of which 'is to secure a home beyond the
reach of financial misfortune, around which gathers the
affection of the family, the greatest incentive to virtue, to
honor, and to industry' (59 So. 2d 881, cited below), on the
theory that the protection of the family is of at least para-
mount importance to the state as the payment of debts."2
Additionally, in Poole v. Cook,2 an 1882 case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that although the homestead provision of
1865 applied only to rural property 2 2 the one in the Constitu-
tion of 1879 applied to both rural and urban property,23 and
the same is true of the present Constitution. 24
It is submitted that the Pouncy rule should apply in all
homestead exemption cases. There is no valid reason for dis-
criminating between the two situations by holding that where
recording is not required the established homestead is superior
to prior ordinary debts not reduced to recorded judgments, but
where recording is required it is superior only as to subsequent
debts. To do so would only result in an unjust discrimination
against the urban property owner.
Ronald W. Tweedel
LABOR LAW-PRODUCT BOYCOTT CLAUSES AND SECTION 8(e)
Secton 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act' provides
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
and an employer to enter into an agreement under which the
employer agrees to refrain from using the products of another
employer. Whether product boycott clauses aimed at "work
19. 127 So.2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 565; cf. Lafayette Bldg. Ass'n v. Spofford, 221 La. 549, 59
So.2d 880 (1952); Hammond State Bank & Trust Co. v. Broderick, 179 La.
693, 154 So. 739 (1934); Garner v. Freeman, 118 La. 184, 42 So. 767 (1907);
Hebert v. Mayer, 48 La. Ann. 938, 20 So. 170 (1896).
21. 34 La. Ann. 333 (1882).
22. La. Acts 1865, No. 33, § 1.
23. La. Const. art. 219 (1879).
24. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
136 (1947), and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-
Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1964). N. L. R. A.
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preservation" in the construction industry are within the pur-
view of section 8(e) has been the subject of great controversy
since the addition of section 8(e) to the Act in 1959.2
Recently the United States Supreme Court faced this ques-
tion in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB.3
There a general contractor was a party to a collective bargain-
ing agreement providing that no union carpenter would handle
doors fitted prior to delivery at the jobsite.4 Although the speci-
fications for the project did not call for pre-fitted doors, the gen-
§ 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e)(1964), added by the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959,
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter
containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure,
or other work: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection
(e) and section 8(b)(4)(B) the terms 'any employer,' 'any person engaged
in commerce or an industry affecting commerce,' and 'any person' when
used in relation to the terms 'any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any other person' shall not include persons
in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor work-
ing on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing
parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing
industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the en-
forcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception."
2. Archibald Cox, chief labor adviser to Senator Kennedy at the time
of passage of the Landrum-Grillin Act, is of the opinion that product boycott
clauses having a primary objective are not prohibited by § 8(e). Cox, The
Landrum-GrifJtn Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MiNN. L. Rsv. 257 (1959). Yet Guy Farmer, former chairman of the National
Labor Relations Board, believes that such clauses are within the ban of
§ 8(e). Farmer, The Status and Application o the Secondary-Boycott and
Hot Cargo Provisions, 48 Gso. L.J. 327 (1960). Stuart Rothman, general
counsel for the National Labor Relations Board, contends that the scope
of § 8(e) depends upon whether the provision encompasses only secondary
pressures. Rothman, Problems Raised by New Secondary-Boycott Reatric-
tione, 45 L.R.R.M. 78 (1959).
3. 87 S.Ct. 1250 (1967).
4. The full text of Rule 17 provides: "No employee shall work on any
job on which cabinet work, fixtures, mill work, sash doors, trim or other
detailed millwork is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the
Union Label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am-
erica. No member of this District Council will handle material coming
from a mill where cutting out and fitting has been done for butts, locks,
letter plates, or hardware of any description, nor any doors or transoms
which have been fitted prior to being furnished on job, including base,
chair, rail, picture moulding, which has been previously fitted. This section
to exempt partition work furnished in sections." The National Labor Re-
lations Board ruled that the first sentence in Rule 17 violated section 8(e),
and the union did not seek judicial review of that determination. 149
N.L.R.B. 646, 655-56 (1964).
[Vol. XXVIII
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eral contractor ordered such doors from a member of the Na-
tional Woodwork Manufacturers Association. When the union
struck to enforce the ban on prefabricated doors, the Association
charged the union with violation of section 8(e) and 8(b) (4)-
(B).5 The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled that the ob-
jective of the contractual clause and the strike to enforce it was
the preservation of work traditionally performed by jobsite
carpenters and that Congress did not intend to prohibit such
primary activity in the enactment of section 8(e) and 8(b) (4)-
(B).
Legislative History
The enactment of section 8(e) by Congress was prompted
by the 1958 decision of the Supreme Court in the Sand Door
case. 6 There the Court ruled that although a "hot cargo" clause1
in a collective bargaining agreement was valid, the union was
guilty of an unfair labor practice in striking to force the general
contractor to comply with its terms. Thus, this decision left the
employer free to disregard a negotiated hot cargo clause.
5. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(1964), as amended by the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, states: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
"(4)(1) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (i) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an in-
dustry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is...
"(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9: Provided, That nothing contained in this
clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise un-
lawful, any primary strike or primary picketing .... "
6. Local 1976, AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). Employees of a general
contractor, whose collective bargaining agreement with the union contained
a hot cargo clause, refused to hang nonunion doors delivered to the building
site.
7. Burstein, The "Hot Cargo" Claws and LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMIENT RPORTING AND DiscLOsuPn ACT OF 1959, 888 (Slovenko ed.
1961): "Traditionally, the hot cargo clause in a labor contract is a signal
to union members to refuse to handle non-union, 'unfair,' or 'struck' goods.
The signatory employer promises that members of the union will not be
required or allowed to handle, process or transport goods or provide services
for or to an unfair company."
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The primary purpose of Congress in enacting section 8(e)
was undoubtedly to prohibit the hot cargo clause." The Lan-
drum-Griffin bill introduced in the House contained the broad
prohibitory language of section 8(e), and did not limit its ap-
plication to secondary activities. 9 This bill passed the House10
and was sent to conference" with the Senate bill.12
The Conference Committee adopted the Landrum-Griffin
bill, barring any agreement by an employer to refrain from
using the products of another employer.'3 In addition to a pro-
viso exempting the garment industry from the prohibition of
section 8 (e), the conference adopted a limited proviso applicable
to the construction industry,' 4 but no other additions were made
to section 8(e).
The Conference Report, in pointing out the effect of the
construction industry proviso, specifically stated:
"It should be particularly noted that the proviso relates
only and exclusively to the contracting or subcontracting
of work to be done at the site of the construction. The pro-
viso does not exempt from section 8 (e) agreements relating
to supplies or other products or materials shipped or other-
wise transported to and delivered on the site of the con-
struction."15
Senator John F. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Conference
8. In congressional hearings and debate § 8(e) was repeatedly referred
to as a measure to close a loophole in § 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1959); 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT or 1959, 942
(hereinafter cited as 1959 LEG. HIST.); H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
20-21 (1959), 1 1959 LEG. HIST. 778-79.
9. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 1 1959 LEG. HIST. 619.
10. 105 CoNo. REc. 14519-20 (1959), 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1691-92.
11. 105 CoNo. REC. 14541 (1959); 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1702.
12. S. 1555, the Senate Bill, contained a hot cargo provision limited only
to agreements between a union and a carrier. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), 1 1959 LEO. HIST. 583.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959), 1 1959 LEG. HIsT.
943.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1959), 1 1959 LEG.
HIST. 943-44. The construction industry proviso states: "Provided, That
nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the con-
struction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other
work .... "
15. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959); 2 1959 LEG. HIST.
943.
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Committee, reiterated this point on the day before final passage
of the bill.16
Before passage of the Conference Bill, two committee mem-
bers stated in a joint analysis of the bill that its broad prohi-
bition would bar subcontracting clauses designed to protect
against loss of jobs by employees.'7 Another conferee later ex-
pressed the same view. 18 Despite these observations both Houses
of Congress passed the bill without change. 19
Primary-Secondary Distinction
In National Woodwork the Court, in holding that Congress
did not really intend what section 8(e) plainly states, cites the
rule "that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers." 20 This principle was held
particularly applicable in construing labor legislation which
results from a compromise between strong opposing forces within
16. Senator Kennedy stated, 105 Cong. Rec. 17900 (1959), 2 1959 LEo. HIST.
1433: "It should be particularly noted that the proviso relates only to the
'contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the con-
struction.' The proviso does not cover boycotts of goods manufactured in an
industrial plant for installation at the job site, or suppliers who do not
work at the job site."
17. In the analysis of the effects of the bill prepared by Senator Kennedy
and Representative Thompson it was stated: "Subcontracting clauses: Com-
panies and unions in manufacturing industries often agree upon restrictions
upon subcontracting in order to protect the employees against the loss of
jobs. For example, a textile concern might agree not to contract out the
mending of cloth while any of its own members were unemployed. It would
not be unusual for a power company to agree not to contract out any of its
line construction while its own regular employees worked less than 40
hours a week. These clauses are frequently negotiated in all kinds of in-
dustries. They have nothing to do with hot cargo agreements or secondary
boycotts. Yet they appear to be outlawed by the House bill." 105 CONG. REC.
16590 (1959), 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1708.
18. Senator Morse observed: "It would prevent a union from protecting
the bargaining unit it represents by obtaining an agreement not to subcon-
tract work normally performed by employees in the unit." 105 CoNG. REc.
17884 (1959); 2 1959 LEG. HIST. 1428.
19. For a tracing of the legislative history to indicate that § 8(e) should
cover both primary and secondary activities, see Dannett, The Legality of
Subcontracting Provisions under Section 8(e), in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 905 (Slovenko ed. 1961).
For a view that § 8(e) was passed in a context of secondary activity and
thus applies only to secondary activities, see Lesnick, Job Security and
Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1000 (1965).
20. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1255 (1967). This rule was first set forth in Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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the nation's economy.21 The Court also stated that the apprehen-
sions about the bill were those of its opponents, not its spon-
sors,22 and that the absence of action to rectify these doubts was
due to a disbelief in the alleged effects of the bill.23 However,
the Court ignores the fact that Senator Kennedy, who expressed
concern as to the effects of the House bill, was Chairman of the
Senate Conference Committee and a proponent of this labor
legislation. Also, the statements of the Conference Committee
members, who were the final drafters of the enacted law, point
out that these effects were in fact clearly envisioned.
The Court held that the broad language of section 8(e) was
passed in a context of secondary activity and was thus intended
to proscribe only secondary activities. Judicial interpretation
of section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act consistently
limited its effect to secondary pressures in "conformity with the
dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor
organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers
in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employ-
ers and others from pressures in controversies not their own. '2 4
Section 8 (e) was viewed by the majority as a loophole closing
measure which did not expand the type of activity which 8 (b) -
(4) (A) prohibited. The Court stated:
"Although the language of section 8 (e) is sweeping, it close-
ly tracks that of section 8 (b) (4) (A), and just as the latter
and its successor section 8(b) (4) (B) did not reach em-
ployees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for
themselves work traditionally done by them, section 8 (e)
does not prohibit agreements made and maintained for that
purpose. '2 5
21. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1255 (1967).
22. The Court states: "It is the sponsors that we look to when the
meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). Although the Court held that
section 8(e) was passed in a context of secondary activity, it apparently
overlooked the fact that the meaning of the statutory language is clear.
23. Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 44 MINN. L. Rsv. 257, 273 (1959): "The fact that Congress re-
jected the attacks upon the secondary boycott provisions of the Landrum-
Griffin bill which alleged that the bill unwisely threw doubt upon the validity
of bona fide restrictions upon subcontracting, may be attributed to disbelief
in the allegation just as easily as to congressional opposition to contractual
restrictions upon managerial freedom to subcontract."
24. NLRB v. Denver Building & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
692 (1951).
25. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1263 (1967).
NOTES
The Court cites the construction industry proviso 26 as further
proof that through section 8(e) Congress sought to prohibit
only secondary activities.27 This proviso exempts from the pro-
hibition of section 8 (e) any agreement relative to the subcon-
tracting of jobsite work. The majority felt that it would be
illogical to uphold agreements preserving the employees' tra-
ditional tasks against jobsite prefabrication but to invalidate
agreements dealing with non-jobsite prefabrication.28 Construing
section 8 (e) as applying only to secondary activities will permit
agreements covering jobsite secondary activities under the con-
struction proviso because of the close community of interests
but will prohibit secondary activity agreements relating to non-
jobsite work.
To further support the primary-secondary distinction the
Court cites the lack of congressional debate as to the effects
which would flow from a literal reading of section 8(e).29 The
majority points out that technological innovation poses complex
problems in the area of job security and that it is only natural
to expect that legislation limiting the right of management and
labor to voluntarily negotiate solutions would be supported by
extensive debate.
The dissenting opinion, however, found that the agreement
fell squarely within the literal impact of section 8(e) and that
the primary-secondary distinction was unwarranted by the leg-
islative history. It states that if section 8 (e) and its legislative
history are examined without preconceptions, it will follow that
product boycott clauses aimed at work preservation are banned.80
In examining the construction industry proviso, the dissent con-
tends that its language and the content of the Conference Report
add support to the idea that agreements covering products
shipped from outside the worksite are prohibited.3 '
The decision in Allen Bradleys 2 and the ensuing congres-
sional response are relied upon heavily by the dissent. In that
26. See note 14 supra.
27. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1265 (1967).
28. Id. The Court states that to hold the construction proviso has only
a limited exemption "would have the curious and unsupported result of
allowing the construction worker to make agreements preserving his tra-
ditional tasks against job-site prefabrication and subcontracting, but not
against nonjob-site prefabrication and subcontracting."
29. Id. at 1266.
30. Id. at 1277.
31. Id.
32. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
1968)
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case the Supreme Court held that a combination between elec-
trical contractors, electrical manufacturers, and the electrical
union under which union members refused to install electrical
equipment manufactured outside New York City violated the
antitrust laws. The union motive was to monopolize electrical
job opportunities for members employed by New York City
electrical contractors and manufacturers. The dissent likens the
product boycott in National Woodwork to that in Allen Bradley
and states that such agreements were proscribed by section
8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. In essence, the dissent
contends that "a product boycott for work preservation purposes
has consistently been regarded by the courts, and by the Con-
gress that passed the Taft-Hartley Act, as a proscribed secondary
boycott."83
In distinguishing the two cases the majority states that
the boycott in Allen Bradley was aimed at secondary objectives
-to secure benefits for other electrical manufacturers and their
employees-rather than work preservation or any other primary
objective. The majority also states that the boycott in Allen
Bradley was used as a "sword" to create and monopolize job
opportunities for union members while in National Woodwork
the boycott was utilized as a "shield" to preserve the jobs tra-
ditionally performed by union members. The dissent, however,
takes the position that the sword-shield distinction is merely a
deceptive play on words by the Court since the boycott in each
case was undertaken for defensive purposes.
Application and Extension of the National Woodwork Rule
In Houston Insulation Contractors Assn. v. NLRB 84 the
Supreme Court carried the National Woodwork principle even
further. There a collective bargaining agreement between Local
22 and a contractors' association stipulated that the employer
would not subcontract work relating to preparation of pipe
and boiler coverings. A general contractor was engaged in a
project within the jurisdiction of Local 113, a sister union of
Local 22. Cutting and mitering of asbestos fittings was custo-
marily performed at this contractor's shop within Local 22's
jurisdiction. When the general contractor purchased prefabri-
cated asbestos fittings for use on the project, Local 113 refused
to install the fittings unless the cutting and mitering were per-
33. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1272 (1967).
34. 87 S.Ct. 1278 (1967).
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NOTES
formed by employees of sister Local 22 as provided in the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The Court held the strike by
Local 113 against the general contractor, with whom Local 113
had no dispute, permissible as a work preservation measure
since it protected primary activity and was not engaged in for
its effect elsewhere.
In Houston Insulation the union strike was not to preserve
work traditionally performed by the striking union, but to pre-
serve work performed by a sister union. The majority relied
on the following test in National Woodwork:
"The touchstone is whether the agreement or its mainte-
nance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting
employer vis-a-vis his own employees." 85
Subsequent decisions have followed the National Woodwork
rule. In NLRB v. Local Union No. 28,86 a collective bargaining
agreement to which a mechanical subcontractor was a party
prohibited the use of prefabricated dampers unless made by a
contractor having a signed agreement with Local 28. When the
subcontractor began using dampers fabricated by a sister union,
Local 28 initiated a product boycott and threatened to shut down
the job. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on
National Woodwork, held that the restrictive clause was applied
for preservation of work traditionally performed by members
of Local 28 and that its application thus comprised lawful pri-
mary activity. The Court, however, did not have before it the
issue of whether the original agreement itself constituted an
8(e) violation since charges were instituted more than six
months after the parties entered the agreement. 87
More recently, in Pipe Fitters Local 455 and Pipe Fitters
Local 539,5 collective bargaining agreements between the unions
and a contractors' association required installation of exterior
boiler piping at the jobsite or in the shop of an employer within
35. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1268 (1967). The Court then restates the test in Houton
Insulation: "[C]ollective activity by employees of the primary employer,
the object of which is to affect the labor policies of that primary employer,
and not engaged In for its effect elsewhere, is protected primary activity."
87 S.Ct. 1278, 1281 (1967).
36. NLRB v. Local Union No. 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n, 380
F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), pro-
vides that no complaint will issue based upon an unfair labor practice which
has occurred more than six months prior to the filing of the unfair labor
practice charge.
38. 167 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1967) and 167 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (1967).
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the bargaining unit bound by the pipefitters' labor agreement.3 9
The NLRB ruled that the prefabrication clauses, which pre-
vented use of packaged boilers on construction projects, were
designed to preserve and reacquire work for the employees in
the bargaining unit. As such, the clauses were ruled primary
work preservation clauses and outside the scope of section 8(e).
Conclusion
It is admitted at the outset that a literal application of
section 8(e) would invalidate many subcontracting clauses now
contained in collective bargaining agreements. 40 This fact tends
to support the majority view in National Woodwork that legis-
lation producing such a result would obtain passage only after
extensive congressional study and debate. However, the Court
apparently overlooks the statements of the conferees who spe-
cifically warned that work preservation clauses would be ban-
ned under the final legislation forged by the Conference Com-
mittee.
More importantly, the Court's technique in construing the
applicable legislation in National Woodwork is unconvincing
and leaves much to be desired. The Court, in spite of the plain
language of section 8(e), derives the primary-secondary dis-
tinction with support from the Holy Trinity Church rule "that
a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the inten-
tion of the makers." Application of this rule appears justified
only when legislative history clearly shows that Congress in-
tended statutory effect different from the literal import of the
words used. Although the rule that unambiguous language of
a statute leaves no room for construction 41 has been somewhat
39. Package boilers, which have trim piping installed at the factory,
first appeared in the Minneapolis area in 1951. By 1963 approximately 70%
of boilers installed on construction projects in the area were packaged
boilers, each representing loss of two days' work on the jobsite for two
union pipefitters. In 1963 the two unions obtained the restrictive prefabri-
cation clauses in their collective bargaining agreements.
40. See Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MONTH-
LY LABOR Rcv. 579 (1961). The Bureau of Labor Statistics, in a 1961 study,
examined 1687 major collective bargaining agreements covering 1,000 or
more workers each and applying in sum to approximately 7.5 million em-
ployees. Of the 1687 agreements examined, 387 of those agreements con-
tained some limitation on subcontracting.
41. The Court apparently discounts the rule that where statutory lan-
guage is clear and free from ambiguity there is no room for construction.
Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U.S. 98 (1937); Helvering,
Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85
(1935).
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eroded in recent years, disregard for the plain and unobscure
language of a statute seems proper only where the legislative
history overwhelmingly supports a construction contrary to its
literal impact. The legislative history of section 8(e) not only
offers a clear repudiation of the National Woodwork decision,
but would also seem to justify criticism of the case as a flagrant
example of judicial usurpation of the legislative function.42
The rationale behind the construction industry proviso may
be found in the relations of the workers at a common jobsite.
Where employees of the general contractor and subcontractors
work alongside each other at the same jobsite, one group may
seek a subcontracting agreement with the contractor to protect
and preserve work performed by that group. In this sense, the
proviso's literal impact would be to exempt agreements limit-
ing subcontracting for jobsite work but not those limiting sub-
contracting for non-jobsite work. Where jobsite employees are
displaced by other jobsite employees rather than by a cost-sav-
ing product fabricated away from the jobsite, the disruptive
effects of a labor dispute are apt to be more pronounced. The
proviso would thus serve the purpose of preventing labor strife
among jobsite workers by protecting an agreement as to job-
site work, but not protecting an agreement as to prefabrication
work done away from the jobsite. 43
In applying the National Woodwork test in future product
boycott cases the crucial question will be whether the union's
ultimate aim is to require the primary employer to allow his
own employees to perform the stipulated work rather than use
a prefabricated product. If the answer is affirmative, then no
violation of section 8 (e) and 8 (b) (4) (B) will be found. Although
still an open question, it would seem that under the National
Woodwork test the work sought need not be work traditionally
performed by these employees; it may be work which they seek
to acquire. If the only requirement is that "the agreement or its
maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting
employer vis-a-vis his own employees," there seems to be no
42. "Perhaps the greatest difficulty in resolving the subcontracting
clause issue stems from a lack of any clear indication of congressional
intent." Comment, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 917 (Slovenko ed. 1961). The doubt as to a clear
congressional intent is reinforced by the diversity of opinion among some of
the nation's leading labor authorities and commentators. See note 3 supra.
43. See Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1176 (1964).
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restriction limiting work to that which has been traditionally
performed by the employee group. A "work acquisition" agree-
ment would still meet the test in that it would be "addressed to
the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own
employees."'44
It is submitted that the decisions in National Woodwork and
Houston Insulation will tend to deprive management of the
benefits of technological innovation, thus hindering the contrac-
tor's competitive position in the industry. If a contractor is
bound by a restrictive product boycott clause limiting managerial
discretion, he will be prevented from purchasing new cost-
reducing products which would reduce his bid. This contractor
will thus be forced to bid a higher price than a contractor who
is not bound by such an agreement and can take full advantage
of cost-saving innovations. Hence the contractor and his em-
ployees may be faced with a serious loss of work due to com-
petition from other contractors who operate free of these restric-
tive agreements.
Also, non-union contractors, who are not bound by these
restrictive clauses, may enjoy an unfair competitive advantage
in some areas. But in areas dominated by union contractors
the general public may also suffer from the higher prices result-
ing from restricted use of cost-saving products. Furthermore,
these decisions may ultimately tend to stifle human initiative
in that innovators will face a greatly curtailed market for their
products. Lack of substantial financial reward may thus tend
to discourage research to produce cost-saving products in the
construction field.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court in formulating the
National Woodwork rule has completely disregarded the literal
impact of section 8(e) to evolve a distinction unsupported by
the plain statutory language or convincing legislative history.
Indeed, as Justice Stewart states in his dissent:
"... the Court is simply substituting its own concepts of
desirable labor policy for the scheme enacted by Congress.""
Harry E. McInnis, Jr.
44. See Johns, Analysis of Philadelphia Pre-Cut Door Decision, LABOR
LAw BULLETIN OF ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, No. 9, at 1
(May 24, 1967).
45. 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1275 (1967).
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